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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent immigration debates in the United States have
shed light on a variety of methods used by immigrants to reach the
U.S. and gain its benefits.' One such method is the rise of so-called
"birth tourism," that is, wealthy people flying to the U.S. so that
their children born here may become citizens.2 Holding onto the
promise of the U.S. Constitution's principle of jus soli-that "[a]ll
persons born or naturalized" on U.S. soil become citizens 3-each
year thousands of foreign pregnant women give birth to new U.S.
citizens after traveling to the United States.!
However, birth tourism is not only a U.S. phenomenon In
fact, the European Court of Justice recently decided a
1. See, e.g., Anna Gorman, The Great Divide of Citizenship, L.A. TIMES, May 6,
2006, at Al, A25; Peter Nicholas, Gov. Says Borders Are Vulnerable, L.A. TIMES, May 6,
2006, at B3.
2. Holly Yeager, US Conservatives Turn Screw on Immigration, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),
Dec. 15, 2005, at 12; Special Report: Born in The USA (KNBC Los Angeles television
broadcast May 26, 2006) (transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment only envisioned extending citizenship to the newly freed slaves, the Supreme
Court later interpreted the amendment as granting citizenship to all children born to
immigrants. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898); see RUTH RUBIO-
MARIN, IMMIGRATION AS A DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE 178 (2000); see also infra note 21
and accompanying text.
4. See Yeager, supra note 2 (estimating that as many as 380,000 babies are born to
illegal immigrants in the U.S. each year).
5. For example, Ireland has also experienced "birth tourism." In 2001, a Dublin
Hospital reported one in five births were to non-nationals. Unique Attitude to Irish
Citizens: Nuala Haughey Takes a Look at This Country's Unique Citizenship Laws, IRISH
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002, Home News section, at 6 [hereinafter Unique Citizenship Laws]. In
the same year, 2,474 asylum-seekers were granted residency in Ireland because they were
parents of Irish-born children, compared to just 909 asylum-seekers granted residency in
2000 (the year Catherine Chen was born). Id.
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controversial case regarding birth tourism in Northern Ireland-
Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.6 The
case centered on the plight of a Chinese couple who avoided
China's restrictive "one-child policy" by planning that their second
child be born in Northern Ireland! The child, Kunqian Catherine
Zhu ("Catherine"), was born in Belfast8 and automatically became
an Irish citizen because of Irish law at the time.' Soon thereafter,
the mother and newborn daughter relocated to Cardiff, Wales in
the United Kingdom.0 However, the UK Secretary of State
refused to grant Catherine and her mother a long-term residence
permit." The family appealed the decision to the Immigration
Appellate Authority, which thereafter sought advice from the
Court of Justice of the European Communities ("ECJ")."2
In its decision, the ECJ pragmatically decided that not only
did Catherine have a right to permanently reside in the UK, but
her mother did as well." The ECJ's decision rested on its
interpretation of several European Community ("EC") principles,
6. Case C-200102, Zhu v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9923
(Chen). It is noteworthy that the judgment was rendered by the ECJ sitting as a full court,
proving the "exceptional importance" of this case. Kristien Vanvoorden, Case-200/02, Zhu
and Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 305, 305
(2005).
7. Id. at 306; Catherine Cosgrave, Immigrant Council of Ireland, Freedom of
Movement and Residence in the European Union: The Chen Case,
http://www.immigrantcouncil.ie/chen.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
8. Chen, supra note 6, paras. 2, 8. Belfast is the capital of Northern Ireland, and part
of the United Kingdom. Paul Gulbenkian, United Kingdom, in ENTRY AND RESIDENCE
IN EUROPE: BUSINESS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION RULES 3 (Paul Gulbenkian, ed.) (1997).
A person born in Northern Ireland can also be considered an Irish citizen from birth.
David Cantrell, Ireland, in ENTRY AND RESIDENCE IN EUROPE: BUSINESS GUIDE TO
IMMIGRATION RULES 172 (Paul Gulbenkian, ed.) (1997).
9. See The Republic of Ireland Nationality and Citizenship Act, § 6(1) (1986). See
generally Cantrell, supra note 8, at 170-71; Michael Robert W. Houston, Note, Birthright
Citizenship in the United Kingdom and the United States: A Comparative Analysis of the
Common Law Basis for Granting Citizenship to the Children Born of Illegal Immigrants,
33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 693 (2000); Claire Breen, Refugee Law in Ireland:
Disregarding the Rights of the Child-Citizen, Discriminating Against the Rights of the Child,
15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 750 (2003); Law Report: Right of Residence After Irish Birth,
TIMES (London), Oct. 21, 2004, at 41. The law has since changed, in part because of the
controversy surrounding this case. Carl O'Brien, Residency for Nearly 17,000 Under New
Parent Law, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 27, 2005, Ireland section, at 4; Vanvoorden, supra note 6,
at 306 n.6.
10. Chen, supra note 6, para. 8. The case only addresses the issues connected with the
mother and daughter-the father is referenced only peripherally.
11. Id. para. 14.
12. See Chen, supra note 6.
13. Id. para. 46
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specifically the Freedom of Movement and Residence, and the
Right to Enjoyment of Family." The ECJ's interpretation of these
principles was unprecedented.
This Note will evaluate the Chen decision and its significant
expansion of these EC principles. While the outcome of Chen is
equitable, and applauded by some," the legal standards it creates
could prove problematic, in particular for EC Member States. 6
Further, it is apparent the ECJ did not decide Chen based on
existing EC precedent, but rather, engaged in judicial activism.'7
Part II of this Note gives the factual background of the case. Part
III analyzes the ECJ's decision and explains how it is a noteworthy
expansion of Community law. Part IV discusses the effects from
the ruling, and Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND'
Man Chen and her husband are both Chinese nationals.'8 The
Chens decided to have a second child, but due to the birth control
policy in China, Mr. and Mrs. Chen knew that having another child
would be problematic and possibly illegal. 9 Thus, in 2000, on the
advice of their lawyers," Mr. and Mrs. Chen arranged to have the
child born in Northern Ireland, since the Irish constitution granted
14. Id. para. 19.
15. See Not so much the 'Right to Family Life' but the 'Right to Have a Family,'
NCADC NEWSZINE, Oct. 2004, http://www.ncadc.org.uk/archives/filed%20
newszines/newszine5l/chen.html (the UK's National Coalition of Anti-Deportation
Campaigns applauded the ruling).
16. See generally COURTS CROSSING BORDERS: BLURRING THE LINES OF
SOVEREIGNTY (Mary L. Volcansek & John F. Stack eds., 2005).
17. Bernhard Hofstotter, A Cascade of Rights, or Who Shall Care for Little Catherine?
Some Reflections on the Chen Case, 30 EUR. L. REV. 548, 551 (2005).
18. Chen, supra note 6, para. 7.
19. Id. Under Chinese law, each family may have only one child unless they satisfy
the special criteria for a second child. Population and Family Planning Law (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, effective Sept. 1, 2002), art.
18, available at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/l1/content_75954.htm (P.R.C.). See also
Nicole M. Skalla, Note, China's One-Child Policy: Illegal Children and the Family
Planning Law, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 329, 334 (2004). Despite its national codification, the
one-child policy is enforced ad hoc throughout China. Id. at 337-38. Women who become
pregnant a second time face the imposition of fines, the disqualification of benefits, the
deprivation of farmland, the destruction of homes, and/or "psychological mauling, sleep
deprivation, arrest and grueling mistreatment." Id. at 338-40.
20. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 549.
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jus soli citizenship - i.e., anyone born on the island at the time
would acquire Irish nationality.22
It was the intent of the Chens to then take advantage of the
child's EC nationality as a way to establish themselves in the UK.23
Soon after Catherine was born in Belfast, Mrs. Chen and her
newborn daughter moved to Cardiff, Wales.2 ' However, the
family's plans were interrupted when the UK's Secretary of State
denied their application for long-term residence. 5 In the main, the
UK officials cited several directives as their rationale for denying
the permit.26 These directives aim to prevent "nationals of other
Member States [from] becoming a financial burden to the host
Member State.,
27
Because their application for residency had been denied, Mrs.
Chen and her daughter suddenly found themselves in a difficult
situation. Mrs. Chen was neither an Irish nor a UK citizen;
therefore, she could not legally stay in the UK without long-term
21residency status. Moreover, since baby Catherine was not a
21. The principle of jus soli refers to "birth on the soil of the sovereign's territory."
Douglas Klusmeyer, Introduction to FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A
CHANGING WORLD 1, 5 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000). Also
referred to as "birthright citizenship," the principle has recently fallen into disfavor among
many nation-states. See John D. Snethen, Comment, The Evolution of Sovereignty and
Citizenship in Western Europe: Implications for Migration and Globalization, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 244 (2000); Miriam Feldblum, Managing Membership: New
Trends in Citizenship and Nationality Policy, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS:
MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra, at 475, 485-86 (noting restrictions on
birthright citizenship in Australia, Canada, and France).
22. See The Republic of Ireland Nationality and Citizenship Act, § 6(1) (1986). In
2002, Ireland was the only country in Europe that granted citizenship by birth. In 2001, a
Dublin Hospital reported one in five births were to non-nationals. See Unique Citizenship
Laws, supra note 5, at 6; see also Anne Lucey, Group Seeks Change to Citizenship Law,
IRISH TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, Home News section, at 8 ("Ireland is the only EU state which
confers automatic citizenship on all children born on the island, according to Ms. Ni
Chonaill. 'This puts Ireland in a uniquely vulnerable situation."').
23. Chen, supra note 6, at para. 11; Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 306.
24. Press Release No. 84/04, Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-200/02 (Oct.
19, 2004) [hereinafter Press Release]; Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 307.
25. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 550.
26. Id. (citing Council Directive 73/148, 1973 O.J. (L 172) 14 (EC) and Council
Directive 90/364, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 26 (EC)). Directives give binding guidelines for
national legislation, and are binding upon the Member States. Ted Badoux, EC Nationals,
in ENTRY AND RESIDENCE IN EUROPE: BUSINESS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION RULES 26
(Paul Gulbenkian, ed.) (1997).
27. Id.
28. Chen, supra note 6, para. 12. The status of "resident" in Europe also entails access
to health care, education, social services, welfare, and, in some member states, local voting
rights. Feldblum, supra note 21, at 484.
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Chinese citizen, Chinese law only allowed Catherine to stay in
China "for not more than 30 days at a time and then only with
permission from the [Chinese] government."29 Thus, Mrs. Chen
could not permanently return to China with Catherine. Faced with
these difficult circumstances, the Chens appealed the Secretary of
State's denial of their application to the Immigration Appellate
Authority, which thereafter sought advice from the ECJ. °
III. ANALYSIS
The ECJ pragmatically decided that not only did Catherine
have a right to reside in the UK, but her mother did as well.' The
ECJ's decision is noteworthy in two particular ways: first, because
it- applies free movement Community law to Catherine's situation,
and second, because it grants a "derivative" right of residency to
Mrs. Chen.3 Both of these two groundbreaking developments will
be analyzed in turn.
A. Community Law Applied to Catherine: Free Movement and
Residence
A major premise of the Chen case was the principle of free
movement within the European Community.33 In fact, this
fundamental EC principle gave the Court its jurisdiction in the
29. Chen, supra note 6, para. 13.
30. The ECJ "plays an important part in the development of Community law.... In
the field of immigration law its jurisprudence, which is also a binding source of supra-
national law for the Member States, has had a major impact." Badoux, supra note 26, at
26. For more information regarding the ECJ, see generally L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM
KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (5th ed. 2000);
RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTEGRATION (1998). "If a national court is in any doubt about the interpretation or
validity of an EU law it may, and sometimes must, ask the Court of Justice for advice."
Europa: European Union Institutions and Other Bodies: The Court of Justice,
http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). This
procedure is crucial to achieve the purpose of the EC, since it ensures Community law is
applied uniformly.
31. See Chen, supra note 6, para. 46.
32. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 557.
33. The free movement of workers is guaranteed by Article 39 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community. See A.P. van der Mei, Freedom of Movement for
Indigents: A Comparative Analysis of American Constitutional Law and European
Community Law, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 803, 830-31 (2002); see also ELSPETH
GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 8 (2001) (describing the
history of "free movement" in Europe).
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case.' In this section, this Note will discuss the origin of the
principle of free movement, the ECJ's recent expansion of the
principle in Chen and other cases, and the criticism of that
expansion.
1. The Origin of Freedom of Movement and Residence
Although the concept of free movement between European
States has always been associated with European citizenship, the
Treaty to the European Community of 1957 ("EC Treaty")
formally articulated the concept.35 In addition to the right of free
movement among Member States, the EC Treaty also includes the
right to reside within a Member State of which a person is not a
national. Although the EC Treaty is a tremendous step toward
European integration, the treaty itself is criticized for not
adequately defining the rights (such as free movement) that it
bestows.
Originally, the concept of free movement was closely
associated with economic activity. 7 Thus, the EC Treaty was
originally interpreted as allowing free movement for employed
and self-employed people. 8 This was based on the presumption
that such persons would not be a financial burden on the Member
State, and that they could provide for themselves and their family
members. Indeed, the traditional purpose of the principle of free
movement was to ensure the Community's objective of a fully-
integrated free market economy. 9 Fundamental rights, such as free
34. Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 307.
35. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 3, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 16 (known as the EEC Treaty); Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992,
1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 (known as the Maastricht Treaty). Note that the Maastricht Treaty, in
its incorporation of the EEC Treaty, changed the name of the EEC Treaty to the
European Community ("EC Treaty"). See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 7 (5th ed. 2003); Sara L.
Uberman, Note, The Brussels II Convention: A Tool Necessary to Enforce Individual
Rights Relating to Matrimonial Matters within the European Union, 23 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 157, 168 (1999).
36. Id.
37. van der Mei, supra note 33, at 829-30.
38. Id. at 830; see also GUILD, supra note 33, at 7.
39. Heather Hunt, Note, Diversity and the European Union: Grant v. SWT, the Treaty
of Amsterdam, and the Free Movement of Persons, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 633, 652
(1999).
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movement, have been described as "capitalist principles that
promote free trade and movement across national borders.""0
In fact, the ECJ has confirmed the economic objective of the
right to free movement. In Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, the
Court noted in particular the Community's goal of the promotion
of a "harmonious development of economic activities" and an
increase in the standard of living." Based on this economic
objective, the Court held that Mrs. Levin, as a part-time worker,
had the right to freely move and work in any Member State.
According to the Court, the determination as to whether an
individual is entitled to the right of free movement stems from
"whether he or she is an active participant in the economy."4
It is important to note that, although the free movement
principle is established in EC treaties, it was never intended to be
absolute. Member States have had the ability to impose limitations
on the right of Community citizens "to enter and take up work
within their territories." 3 In fact, "Member States may base these
limitations on public policy, public security, and/or public health.
In addition, states are free 'to determine the requirements of
public policy in light of their national needs,"' as long as those
requirements comply with EC purposes."
2. The Expansion of Freedom of Movement
In the early 1970s, however, the ECJ began to interpret the
principles of free movement of workers broadly in order to
achieve a general right of residence for all European citizens.4' This
general right of residence would be one "no longer linked to, or
conditional on, the pursuit of economic activities."4 Indeed,
40. Id.
41. Id. at 653.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 652.
44. Id.
45. van der Mei, supra note 33, at 830. The expanding interpretation of the free
movement doctrine met high-ranking criticism. In 1987, Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher complained that "[W]e joined Europe to have free movement of goods.., not to
have free movement of terrorists, criminals . . . and illegal immigrants." George
Katrougalos, The Rights of Foreigners and Immigrants in Europe: Recent Trends, 5 WEB J.
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (1995), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles5/katart5.html.
46. van der Mei, supra note 33, at 840; Malcolm Anderson et al., European
Citizenship and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, in MAASTRICHT AND BEYOND:
BUILDING THE EUROPEAN UNION 107 (Andrew Duff et al. eds., 1994) (noting the ECI's
"expansive interpretation of freedom of movement").
2007]
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Member States' nationals would, as European citizens, enjoy the
general right of residence contemplated by the EC. 7
For example, the ECJ expanded the general right of free
movement to encompass the family members of workers. 8 The
term "family members" eventually came to include the workers'
spouse, their children and grandchildren under the age of twenty-
one years or financially dependent, and the dependent parents and
grandparents.49 These family members were allowed to move and
reside along with the worker under the assumption that the
worker, and not the host state, would provide for the family
member. However, over the years, the ECJ strengthened the legal
status of family members of workers, so that they no longer had to
depend on the worker. °
Similarly, two recent ECJ cases demonstrate the EC's desire
for a general right of residence. First, in Mary Carpenter v.
Secretary of State of the Home Department, the ECJ was faced with
the UK's imminent deportation of Mrs. Carpenter, a third-country
national.5 In Carpenter, the Court created a necessary link with
Community law to help avoid the deportation: the Court
"contented itself with the fact that Mr. Carpenter, although
resident in the United Kingdom, provided services in other
Member States."52 Thus, the Court granted Mrs. Carpenter a right
of residence based on her husband's trade and established the
ECJ's preliminary step towards expanding the right of residence.
The ECJ went even further in the recent Garcia Avello
decision." There, the Court did not require the movement-based
argument with regard to the Community law link that it had
47. van der Mei, supra note 33, at 830; see also Flora Goudappel & Silvia Romein,
Evolving Legal Personality: The Case of European Union Citizenship, 11 IUS GENTIUM 1,
15-16 (2005).
48. van der Mei, supra note 33, at 830.
49. Id. at 836.
50. Id.
51. Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6279,
para. 2. See generally Goudappel & Romein, supra note 47, at 30 (explaining key facts of
Carpenter). Throughout this Note, the term "third-country national" is used to reference
individuals from non-European Community nations who are attempting to use EC law
and a legal relationship with one European Country in order to justify residency in
another European Country.
52. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 551.
53. Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello v. Belgian State, 2003 E.C.R. 1-11613, para. 45. See
generally, Goudappel, supra note 47, at 27-28 (detailing the background of the Avello
case).
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required in Carpenter. Instead, the Garcia Avello court ruled that,
"in the absence of any cross-border movement, having the
nationality of a Member State other than that of the host state's
would be sufficient in order to open up the scope of application of
Community law."" As Garcia Avello and Carpenter demonstrate,
the EC is leaning closer to a general right of residence, one that is
no longer dependent on free movement or on its economic
purposes.
3. Freedom of Movement in Chen
As we have seen, the right of free movement was originally
intended only for economic actors and purposes. In recent years,
however, the ECJ has gradually expanded the language of the
treaties to grant the right to the worker's family members and
spouses. In addition, the Court has shunned the movement-based
requirement for the Community rights associated with free
movement. 5 The result has been the achievement of a general
right of residence.
Indeed, Chen picks up where Garcia Avello left off. Since
Belfast is in the UK, young Catherine in Chen was born in the host
Member State.5" Thus, Catherine never made use of the right of
free movement because she and her mother only traveled from
Belfast to Wales." The UK argued to the ECJ that this meant the
situation was purely internal, so that the ECJ would not have
jurisdiction in the case. 8
Surprisingly, the ECJ disagreed. In the Court's opinion, the
fact that Catherine had never traveled between Member States did
not make the case a purely internal situation, and the Community
had authority in the matter. 9 The Court's decision has led many to
believe that the ECJ is more than willing to find jurisdiction in
controversial cases. ' For Community lawyers, however, the ECJ
did not provide a legal criteria or foundation for its decision,
54. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 552.
55. Id. at 551.
56. Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 306.
57. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 549.
58. Id. at 552. "The ECJ has consistently maintained that a person cannot invoke
Community rights dealing with free movement and residence of persons against a Member
State, when the situation is wholly internal to the Member State." Vanvoorden, supra note
6, at 311.
59. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 552.
60. See Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 311.
2007] 299
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leaving the legal area in flux.6 ' Rather, European lawyers are left
merely with the narrow holding that "a national of a Member State
who was born in the host Member State and has not made use of
the right of free movement cannot, for that reason alone, be
assimilated to a purely internal situation."'62
Since Catherine's lack of movement between Member States
proved problematic for the ECJ, the Court was forced, in a sense,
to make an exception for the young girl and her mother. In its
decision, the Court emphasized the fact that Catherine had
received Irish nationality, while residing in the UK.63 Thus, in
addition to movement between Member States, another sufficient
condition is having the nationality of a Member State other than
the one you are residing in.' For the Court, this was the fact that
allowed them to find in the Chens' favor. Indeed, if the facts had
been different, if Catherine had been born in the Republic of
Ireland (and not in Northern Ireland) and continued to reside
there, "reliance on a right of residence flowing from Union
citizenship would have been forestalled."6' While she would have
been entitled to reside in Ireland on the basis of her Irish
nationality,' her mother would not have been able to derive any
rights of residence from Catherine's nationality." Under Irish law,
Mrs. Chen most assuredly would have been deported.'
The Chen ruling creates a new standard for attaining
Community rights of residence." Under the current EC Treaty,
61. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 552.
62. Chen, supra note 6, para. 19.
63. Chen, supra note 6, paras. 38-40.
64. Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 312.
65. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 553.
66. Id. ("[N]o one may be expelled from the territory of a state of which he or she is a
national.").
67. Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art.3(1), Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46.
68. See Lobe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, [2003] I.E.S.C. 3 (23rd
January, 2003) (S.C.) (Ir.). In Lobe, "[t]he [Irish] Supreme Court, by a five-two majority,
subsequently upheld the decision of the High Court in deciding that non-national parents
of Irish-born children and their non-national siblings were not entitled to live in Ireland by
virtue of having an Irish-born child." Breen, supra note 9, at 780. See also Joined Cases 35
& 36/82, Morson, Jhanjan v. Neth., 1982 E.C.R. 3723. In Morson, the ECJ decided that
third-country nationals who were parents of "Dutch citizens [were] not entitled to rely on
Community law to invoke a right of residence since their claim concerned a wholly
internal situation, in light of the fact that the Dutch children had never exercised their
right to free movement." Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 313 n.60.
69. Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 312.
[Vol. 29:291300
Chen and Residency Rights in Europe
crossing the borders of Member States triggers the operation of
European Union citizenship and its provisions." Thus, for those in
Europe who are residing in a Member State, and have never
moved to another Member State, these people are "in a wholly
internal situation and are thus excluded from relying on
Community provisions."71 However, Chen recognizes that the
exercise of the right of free movement is not a prerequisite to the
invocation of Community rules on residence. This might mean that
such "second class citizens" -those who have not moved from
more than one Member State-might soon receive Community
benefits. This development would be a first in the EC and would
constitute an abandonment of the original purpose of the principle
of free movement.
It is believed that cases such as Garcia Avello and Chen are
expansive decisions regarding residency and citizenship that
represent the Court's attempt at constitutionalizing Union
citizenship." As such, the Court decided that the law should
reward the "cross-border active citizen over the Union citizen who
by and large has stayed at home." 3 In addition, at least one
European scholar suspects the Court is trying to create a legal
"loophole," which would "act as a trigger to completely dispose of
the 'link with Community law' requirement in future cases.""
Evidently, the ECJ is willing to accept facts that are "more and
more aloof from a movement-based argumentation."" The Chen
decision, and the Court's refusal to view the decision as a UK
internal situation, clearly support these theories.
70. Anderson et al., supra note 46, at 105.
71. Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 313 (referring also to these people as "second class
citizens."); see also Goudappel & Romein, supra note 47, at 33-34.
72. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 551; see also Goudappel & Romein, supra note 47, at
15-16.
73. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 551. "Indeed the invocation of a meaningful concept
of citizenship fits uneasily with the classical economic actor centred [sic] view, which looks
at the disadvantaged non-moving citizen and reverse discrimination as undesirable and yet
unavoidable consequences of the limited scope of application of Community law." Id.
(emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 552.
75. Id. at 558.
20071
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4. Criticism of the Expansion of the Right of Freedom of
Movement in Chen
Although the results in cases like Garcia Avello and Chen are
compelling, they set a troubling precedent within the EC. Among
other arguments, (1) the expansion of the right of residency
necessarily results in a loss of Member State sovereignty, and (2)
the ECJ's decisions are not legally supported. Each of these
criticisms will be analyzed in turn.
First, the Chen decision inherently undermines the
sovereignty of the Member States, specifically in their ability to
decide their own residency requirements.76  As previously
mentioned, traditionally the States were allowed to restrict the
free movement to meet each State's public policies. This sovereign
right gradually has been removed by the ECJ,77 thus laying the
groundwork for decisions like Chen.
Decisions like Chen contradict the desires of Member States,
as evidenced in numerous EC documents. In those documents, the
States have collectively emphasized their right to take such
measures as they consider necessary for the purpose of controlling
immigration. 8 But the ECJ has apparently disregarded those
explicit qualifications on the part of Member States.
Community law has not only removed the Member States'
right to decide who is a resident in their country, but also has
arrested their right to decide who can come into their country via
citizenship of another state. For example, the ECJ has previously
held that "the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality
are a matter for each Member State and a Member State cannot
restrict' the effects of the grant of the nationality of another
Member State." 9 Such decisions are an assault on the traditional
notions of national sovereignty.8
76. See GUILD, supra note 33, at 8, 13.
77. For example, in 1976, the ECJ held that the freedom of movement was a right
"which the national courts must protect and take precedence over any national rule which
might conflict with them." GUILD, supra note 33, at 8, 14 (citing Case 118/75, Watson &
Belmann, 1976 E.C.R. 1185).
78. See e.g., General Declaration on Articles 13 to 19 of the Single European Act,
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 504 (1986) ("Nothing in these provisions shall affect the right of
Member States to take such measures as they consider necessary for the purpose of
controlling immigration from third countries."); A CITIZENS' EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A
NEW ORDER 185 (Allan Rosas & Esko Antola eds., 1995).
79. Press Release, supra note 24 (emphasis supplied).
80. See A CITIZENS' EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER, supra note 78, at 185.
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Interestingly, the ECJ's decision in Chen typifies the current,
worldwide trend in regards to national sovereignty. At least one
scholar has noted that transnational institutions like the ECJ have
challenged the national sovereignty of control and implementation
of domestic migration, immigration, and citizenship policy."' This
transnationalization of migration policy has resulted in the
unfortunate displacement of traditional components of national
sovereignty." This trend by transnational actors has forced states -
like the UK in Chen-to fight to maintain their sovereignty in
domestic issues. But contrary to some studies in the area,"3 cases
like Chen suggest that nation-states worldwide are losing this
modern-day power struggle.
Another criticism of the Chen decision is that the ECJ's legal
arguments are questionable. Common complaints regarding the
decision argue it is "dogmatically unsatisfactory" and "merely
instrumental to the result pursued."' As noted above, the ECJ's
interpretation of Article 8 of the EC Treaty on free movement was
unprecedented, and only tenuously supported by previous ECJ
decisions. Thus, critics have come to view Chen as an unfortunate
milestone of the Court's practice of constructive interpretation of
Community principles. 5
The ECJ's use of constructive interpretation is well known in
Europe.' In fact, "[t]here is a commonly held opinion that the
court 'finds' in the EC Treaty ideas, values, concepts, norms, [and]
principles that are totally absent from the explicit words. Here
arises the worry about 'invention masquerading as
interpretation."" 7 While some in Europe rationalize this practice,'
81. Feldblum, supra note 21, at 489-90.
82. Id. at 490.
83. E.g., id. at 492 (noting scholar Christian Joppke's research of Germany, Britain,
and the United States which suggests the control of states in areas like citizenship and
immigration is "not declining").
84. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 551.
85. Joxerramon Bengoetxea, et al., Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of
the European Court of Justice, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 44-45 (Grainne de
Burca & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2001).
86. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 324. Undoubtedly, one of the
rationales for this practice is the general vagueness of the Treaties. Id. at 325.
87. Bengoetxea, et al., supra note 85, at 44-45.
[T~he Court may be led to disregard the plainest of wording in order to give
effect to what it deems the overriding aims and objects of the Treaties. In other
words the literal interpretation is displaced by the contextual or teleological
approach, although the Court may speak rather in terms of looking to 'the spirit'
of the text in question.
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the Court's habit of "finding" principles from the plain words of
the treaties creates tenuous legal precedents. Thus, criticism of the
Chen case includes both a concern over Member States'
sovereignty, and an ongoing complaint over the interpretational
methods used by the ECJ.
B. Derivative Right of Residency for Mrs. Chen
As we have seen, the Chen decision was an expansion of the
free movement and the right of residency in the EC. In addition,
the Chen case also dealt with whether Mrs. Chen could benefit
from Catherine's right of residence, that is, whether Article 18(1)
of the EC Treaty could confer a derivative right of residence on a
third-country national.89 This section will briefly evaluate the ECJ's
decision to confer that right, and provide criticisms of the Court's
ruling.
1. A Derivative Right of Residence
As a starting point, the ECJ noted that Mrs. Chen was the
primary caregiver for Catherine. As such, the Court relied heavily
on its 2002 ruling in Baumbast and R." In that case, a third-country
national had married a European migrant worker, and had several
children by that worker.9' After the parents divorced, the third-
country national hoped to rely on her children's right of
residence. 2 While the children clearly had the right to finish their
respective educations in the host member state,93 there was no law
applicable regarding the third-country national.94
Upon these facts, the ECJ found that "[t]he right conferred..
on the child of a migrant worker to pursue, under the best
possible conditions, his education in the host Member State
BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 324.
88. Bengoetxea, et al., supra note 85, at 44-45. "All legal interpretation is
constructive' interpretation .... [C]onstructive interpretation has to be highly sensitive to
context, and the context of any particular act of legal interpretation is the need to find a
way of making sense of a test in the context of a large-scale normative scheme." Id.
89. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 553.
90. Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. I-
7091. See generally Goudappel & Romein, supra note 47, at 23-27 (explaining facts of the
case).
91. Goudappel & Romein, supra note 47, at 23.
92. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 553.
93. Id. (citing Council Regulation 1612/68, art. 12, 1968 J.O. (L 257) 2 (EC)).
94. Id.
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necessarily implies that the child has the right to be accompanied by
the person who is his primary carer."9' In its ruling, the Court noted
the child's financial and emotional dependence on a primary
caregiver, so that a Member State's refusal to permit the parent to
stay would in fact frustrate the Community rights of the child.96
This form of protecting rights is known as an effet utile ("useful
effect") legal theory. 7
Before Chen, it was unclear how far the Baumbast and R
decision could extend. In Baumbast and R, the right of residence
for the primary caregiver flowed from ancillary rights
unmistakably contingent on the movement of the migrant worker. 9
In Chen, however, the question was whether the same right of
residence could be derived simply from Union citizenship.9
The ECJ's grant of the right of residence to Mrs. Chen
indicates the primary caregiver argument applies with equal
strength in the case of Union citizenship.1" The interpretation of
Article 18(1) as a directly effective right in Baumbast and R and
thus conferring a tangible legal right on the Union citizen led to
the acceptance of derived rights in Chen.'° In fact, this finding is
not inhibited by the fact that Chen concerns a right derived from
the original right of residence. 2 The Union citizenship of the
dependent child is sufficient in order to confer a right of residence
on the caring third-country parent.03
Thus, for the first time, the Chen judgment applied the effet
utile theory to grant a right of residence to the primary caregiver of
a non-economically active citizen."°' In so doing, "the ECJ made
clear that a right of residence of a third-country national can be
linked not only to the right of residence predicated on the conduct
of economic activities by a Union citizen, but also from the right of
95. Baumbast, 2002 E.C.R 1-7091, para. 73 (emphasis supplied).
96. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 553.
97. Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 318.
98. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 554.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. "Conferring a right of residence on the primary care[giver] of a Union citizen
gives rise to a number of further intricate legal questions. When, for instance, does the
right contingent on the child's need for emotional and financial care expire?" Id. at 555.
Further, does the derived right of residence as a primary caregiver entitle them to equal
access to the labor market and other social advantages? Id.
103. Id.
104. Vanvoorden, supra note 6, at 318.
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residence based on the mere status of 'Union citizen." '' 5 For the
first time, the ECJ thereby "equated the rights of economically
active and non-economically active Union citizens in the field of
free movement and residence... 6
2. Criticism of the Derivative Right of Residence
One of the frustrations of Chen is the ECJ's silence regarding
the scope of this derivative right of residence. Based on the
Court's decision, it remains unclear whether this derivative right is
only available on facts similar to Chen, and "to whom such a
derivative right can be recognized."0 7 In the Carpenter case, the
ECJ granted a derivative right to the spouse and in Baumbast and
R and Chen such a right was granted to the primary caregiver. But
what if the primary caregiver of the Union citizen is simply a legal
guardian, or not related to the Union citizen? Or, in the case of
Chen, what if Catherine's older Chinese-national brother had
asked for a right of residence? In other words, can the derivative
right of residence be stretched as far as to grant a right of
residence to a guardian or sibling?" The ECJ's decision in Chen is
frustratingly vague as to these preceding issues. It will be up to
future cases to determine the scope of this newfound right.
Critics have also complained that the Chen decision rewards
people like Mrs. Chen who have, in effect, found a legal
loophole." This is argued to be particularly unjust because it
rewards those in society who have both discretionary finances and
legal representation."' At the very least, the Chen decision
highlights problems with the current residence system in Europe
and suggests that legal loopholes can be found.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
The Chen case had a profound effect in Ireland, shedding
light on. a legal system many Irish citizens felt needed to be
updated."' As mentioned previously, at the time the events of the
case unfolded, the Irish constitution provided for automatic Irish
105. Id.
106. Id. (emphasis supplied).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 558.
110. Id.
111. Lucey, supra note 22.
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nationality by reason of being born on the island of Ireland. 2 This
provision, although intended to enable Northern Irish to acquire
Irish citizenship, opened the door to third-country nationals
benefiting from Irish-and therefore Union- citizenship.'13 This
"loophole," eventually magnified in the Chen case, "sparked off a
fierce political debate in Ireland leading to a referendum on June
11, 2004.
'
,1
14
As a result of the referendum, the Irish Nationality and
Citizenship Act 2004 introduced a new provision regarding the
granting of Irish citizenship to non-nationals."5 The Act requires
"lawful residence of three years within the four years immediately
preceding the child's birth for third-country national parents,
before a child born to them can acquire Irish nationality." The Act
entered into force on January 1, 2005."i6
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Chen typifies a recent trend of the Community
undermining the sovereignty of the Member States. It is a decision
that further expanded the principle of free movement, and also
granted a derivative right of residence-both unprecedented
decisions by the Court. It is a decision that will undoubtedly
impact both immigrants and legal residents in the Member States
for years to come. Unfortunately, the decisions of such
transnational institutions like the ECJ are in direct opposition to
what many citizens in Europe desire for their nation's residency
and citizenship laws."7
David H. King*
112. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 557; see also Unique Citizenship Laws, supra note 5.
113. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 557.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also O'Brien, supra note 9.
116. Hofstotter, supra note 17, at 557.
117. See id. at 548.
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